Consistent approximations of belief functions by Fabio Cuzzolin
Consistent approximations of belief functions
Fabio Cuzzolin
INRIA Rhˆ one-Alpes
655 avenue de l’Europe, 38334 Montbonnot, France
Fabio.Cuzzolin@inrialpes.fr
Abstract
Consistent belief functions represent collections of co-
herent or non-contradictory pieces of evidence. As most
operators used to update or elicit evidence do not preserve
consistency, the use of consistent transformations cs[¢] in a
reasoning process to guarantee coherence can be desirable.
These are in turn linked to the problem of approximating an
arbitrary belief function with a consistent one.
We study here the consistent approximation problem in the
case in which distances are measured using classical Lp
norms. We show that for each choice of the element we want
them to focus on, the partial approximations determined by
the L1 and L2 norms coincide, and that they can be inter-
preted as the classical focused consistent transformation.
Global solutions do not coincide, in general, nor are they
associated with the highest plausibility element.
1 The consistent approximation problem
Belief functions (b.f.s) [19] are complex objects, in
which different and sometimes contradictory bodies of evi-
dence may coexist, as they mathematically describe the fu-
sion of possibly conﬂicting expert opinions and/or impre-
cise/ corrupted measurements, etcetera. Making decisions
based on such objects can then be misleading. This is a
well known problem in classical logics, where the applica-
tion of inference rules to inconsistent sets of assumptions or
“knowledge bases” may lead to incompatible conclusions,
depending on the subset of assumptions we start our reason-
ing from.
Consistent belief functions (cs.b.f.s), i.e. belief functions
whose non-zero mass events or “focal elements” have
non-empty intersection, are then particularly interesting as
they represent collections of coherent or non-contradictory
pieces of evidence. It is then desirable to design a method
which, given an arbitrary belief function b, generates a con-
sistent or non-contradictory belief function cs[b]: we call
this consistent transformation.
This is all the more valuable as several important operators
used to update or elicit evidence represented as belief mea-
sures, like Dempster’s sum [8] and disjunctive combination
[21], do not preserve consistency. To guarantee the consis-
tency of our state of belief we may seek a scheme in which
each time new evidence is combined to yield a new b.f., the
consistent transformation cs[¢] is applied to reduce it to a
coherent knowledge state.
Now, consistent transformations can be built by solv-
ing a minimization problem of the form cs[b] =
argmincs2CS dist(b;cs), where dist is any distance mea-
surebetweenbelieffunctions, andCS denotesthecollection
of all consistent b.f.s. We call this the consistent approxi-
mation problem.
By plugging in different distance functions we get different
consistent transformations. In this paper, in particular, we
study what happens when using classical Lp norms.
From a technical point of view, consistent b.f.s do not
live in a single linear space, but in a collection of higher-
dimensional triangles or simplices, called “simplicial com-
plex” [11]. A partial solution has then to be found sepa-
rately for each maximal simplex of the consistent complex.
These partial solutions are later to be compared to deter-
mine the global optimal solution.
We will prove that partial approximations determined by
both L1 and L2 norms not only are unique and coincide, but
that the L1/L2 consistent approximation onto each compo-
nent CSx of CS generates indeed the consistent transforma-
tion focused on x [10, 1], i.e. a new belief function whose
focal elements have the form A0 = A [ fxg, where A is a
focal element of the original b.f. b.
The associated global L1/L2 solutions do not lie in general
on the component of the consistent complex related to the
maximal plausibility element.
Paper outline. After recalling the notions of consistent
and consonant belief functions, we will recall their seman-
tics and stress why it can be desirable to transform a generic
belief function into a consistent b.f. (Section 2). As we pose
the approximation problem in a geometric framework, we
brieﬂy recall in Section 3 the geometry of consistent b.f.s.As they form a complex, we need to solve the approxima-
tion problem separately for each maximal simplex (Section
4). After gaining some insight from the analysis of the bi-
nary case (Section 5), we proceed to solve the L1 and L2
consistent approximation problems in the general case in
Section 6. We ﬁnally comment and interpret our results.
2 Semantics of consistent belief functions
Weﬁrstrecallthebasicnotionsofthetheoryofevidence,
and that of consistent belief functions in particular, to later
discuss their semantics [19].
Deﬁnition 1 A basic probability assignment (b.p.a.) on a
ﬁnite set (frame of discernment [19]) £ is a set function
mb : 2£ ! [0;1] on 2£ : = fA µ £g s.t. 1. mb(;) = 0; 2. P
Aµ£ mb(A) = 1; 3. mb(A) ¸ 0 8A µ £.
Subsets of £ associated with non-zero values of mb are
calledfocalelements(f.e.), andtheirintersectioncore: Cb
: = T
Aµ£:mb(A)6=0 A.
Deﬁnition 2 The belief function (b.f.) b : 2£ ! [0;1] as-
sociated with a basic probability assignment mb on £ is
deﬁned as: b(A) =
P
BµA mb(B).
A dual mathematical representation of the evidence en-
coded by a belief function b is the plausibility function
(pl.f.) plb : 2£ ! [0;1], A 7! plb(A) where plb(A) : =
1 ¡ b(Ac) = 1 ¡
P
BµAc mb(B) expresses the amount of
evidence not against A.
In the theory of evidence a probability function is simply a
special belief function assigning non-zero masses to single-
tons only (Bayesian b.f.): mb(A) = 0 jAj > 1.
Consonant belief functions are b.f.s whose f.e.s E1 ½ ¢¢¢ ½
Em are nested. The latter always have a non-empty com-
mon intersection, namely the smallest f.e. E1. However,
not all b.f.s whose core is non-empty are consonant.
Deﬁnition 3 A belief function is said to be consistent if its
core is non-empty.
Semantics of consistent b.f.s. Consistent belief func-
tions (cs.b.f.s) form a signiﬁcant class of b.f.s, for sev-
eral reasons. On one side, they correspond to possibil-
ity distributions, and form therefore with consonant b.f.s
the link between evidence and possibility theory. More
importantly, though, they are the analogues of consis-
tent, non-contradictory sets of propositions (“knowledge
bases”) in logics. As maintaining coherence along an in-
ference process is highly desirable, the utility of an operator
which transforms general belief functions to consistent ones
emerges. This is all the more valuable as several evidence
combination rules, like Dempster’s sum [8] and disjunctive
combination [21] do not preserve consistency. To guarantee
the consistency of our knowledge state it makes then sense
to adopt a scheme like the following (where we use © to
denote a valid combination rule)
b1;b2 ! b1 © b2
#
cs[b1 © b2]; b3 ! cs[b1 © b2] © b3
#
cs[cs[b1 © b2] © b3]
(1)
When new evidence is combined to yield a new belief state,
the consistent transformation cs[¢] is applied to ensure co-
herence.
Consistent b.f.s and possibility distributions. In pos-
sibility theory [9, 14], subjective probability is mathemat-
ically described by possibility measures, i.e. functions
Pos : 2£ ! [0;1] such that Pos(;) = 0, Pos(£) = 1
and Pos
¡S
i Ai
¢
= supi Pos(Ai), for any family of sub-
sets fAijAi 2 2£;i 2 Ig, where I is an arbitrary set index.
Each measure Pos is uniquely characterized by a possibil-
ity distribution ¼ : £ ! [0;1], ¼(x) : = Pos(fxg), via the
formula Pos(A) = supx2A ¼(x).
A central role in the connection between possibility and ev-
idence theory [20, 18, 14, 12, 23, 3] is played by consonant
and consistent belief functions. On one side,
Proposition 1 The plausibility function plb associated with
a b.f. b is a possibility measure iff b is consonant.
On the other, after calling plausibility assignment ¹ plb the re-
striction of the plausibility function to singletons ¹ plb(x) =
plb(fxg) it can be proven that [13, 5]
Proposition 2 The plausibility assignment ¹ plb associated
with a belief function b is the admissible possibility distri-
bution of a possibility measure iff the b.f. b is consistent.
Consistent b.f.s are then the counterparts of possibility dis-
tributions in the theory of evidence.
A different, powerful semantics comes in terms of consis-
tent knowledge bases.
Consistent b.f.s as collections of coherent pieces of
evidence. Belief functions are complex objects, in which
sometimes contradictory bodies of evidence may coexist,
as they may result from the fusion of possibly conﬂicting
expert opinions and/or imprecise/corrupted measurements.
This is a classical problem in formal logics, where the ap-
plication of inference rules to inconsistent sets of assump-
tions or “knowledge bases” may lead to incompatible con-
clusions, depending on the subset of assumptions we start
from [17, 2]. Paris, for instance, tackles the problem by not
assuming each proposition in the knowledge base as a fact,
but by attributing to it a certain degree of belief [16].
A mechanism able to obtain a consistent knowledge base
from an inconsistent one is then desirable. In the theory ofevidence such a mechanism can be there be described as
an operator cs : B ! CS, b 7! cs[b] where B;CS denote
respectively the set of all b.f.s, and that of all cs.b.f.s.
Consistent belief functions and combination rules.
Such a transformation assumes even more importance when
we notice that most operators used to update/elicit evidence
in the theory of evidence do not preserve consistency.
Deﬁnition 4 Theorthogonalsumor Dempster’ssumoftwo
belief functions b1;b2 is a new belief function b1 © b2 with
b.p.a. mb1©b2(A) =
P
B\C=A mb1(B) mb2(C) P
B\C6=; mb1(B) mb2(C), where mbi
denotes the b.p.a. associated with bi.
Their disjunctive combination is a new belief function b1 \
b2 with b.p.a. mb1\b2(A) =
P
B\C=A mb1(B)mb2(C).
Their conjunctive combination is instead the b.f. b1 [ b2
with b.p.a. mb1[b2(A) =
P
B[C=A mb1(B)mb2(C).
Now, it is not difﬁcult to prove that:
Proposition 3 If b1;b2 are consistent then b1 [ b2 is also
consistent. On the other hand, ff b1;b2 are consistent and
their cores Cb1, Cb2 have non-empty intersection, then both
b1 ©b2 and b1 \b2 are consistent with core Cb1\b2 = Cb1 \
Cb2. Finally, if Cb1 \ Cb2 = ; then b1 © b2, b1 \ b2 are not
consistent.
In other words, consistency is preserved by the conjunctive
rule, the price to pay being increasing uncertainty as new
evidence is combined, since the core of the belief state tends
to £ (complete ignorance). On the other side, Dempster’s
ruleanddisjunctivecombinationspreserveconsistencyonly
whenthecollection offocal elementsofb1 and b2 isalready
consistent (i.e. any intersection A \ B of a f.e. A of b1 and
a f.e. B of b2 is non-empty). As long as the new evidence is
consistent with the existing one uncertainty is reduced. The
price to pay is the loss of consistency in most cases.
The use of a consistent transformation in a reasoning pro-
cess (1) would then guarantee consistency while allowing
the uncertainty on the problem to decrease with time.
Making a belief function consistent. Consistent trans-
formations can be built by posing a minimization problem
cs[b] = arg min
cs2CS
dist(b;cs) (2)
where dist is some distance measure between belief func-
tions, and CS denotes again the collection of all consistent
b.f.s. We call (2) the consistent approximation problem.
Plugging in different distance functions in (2) we get differ-
ent consistent transformations.
In this paper we study what happens when using classi-
cal Lp norms in the approximation problem. As possibility
measures are inherently related to the L1 norm (see above)
cs.b.f.s live in a space linked to such a norm (Section 3).
This leads to suppose that Lp-based approximations may
indeed generate meaningful consistent transformations.
3 The complex of consistent belief functions
To solve the consistent approximation problem (2) we
need to understand the structure of the space in which
cs.b.f.s live. We can then move forward and ﬁnd the projec-
tion of b onto this space by minimizing the chosen distance.
A belief function is determined by its N ¡ 2, N = 2j£j
beliefvaluesfb(A) ; ( A ( £g(sinceb(;) = 0, b(£) = 1
always). It can then be thought of as a vector of RN¡2. The
collection B of points of RN¡2 which are b.f.s is a “sim-
plex”(inroughwordsahigher-dimensionaltriangle), which
we call belief space. B is the convex closure1
B = Cl(bA;; ( A µ £)
of the (“dogmatic”) belief functions bA assigning all the
masstoasingleeventA: mb(A) = 1, mb(B) = 08B 6= A.
Each b.f. b 2 B can be written as a convex sum as
b =
X
;(Aµ£
mb(A)bA (3)
i.e. the b.p.a. mb is nothing but the set of simplicial coordi-
nates of b in B.
The geometry of consistent belief functions can be de-
scribed as a structure collection of simplices or simplicial
complex [7]. More precisely, CS is the union
CS =
[
x2£
Cl(bA;A 3 x)
ofmaximal simplicesCl(bA;A 3 x) formedby all b.f. with
core on a single element x of £.
Example: the binary case. As an example let us
consider a frame of discernment containing only two el-
ements, £2 = fx;yg. In this very simple case each b.f.
b : 2£2 ! [0;1] is completely determined by its belief val-
ues b(x);b(y) as it is always true that b(£) = 1;b(;) = 0
8b 2 B. We can then represent b as the vector
[b(x) = mb(x);b(y) = mb(y)]0
of RN¡2 = R2 (since N = 22 = 4). Since mb(x) ¸ 0,
mb(y) ¸ 0, and mb(x) + mb(y) · 1 the set B2 of all the
possible belief functions on £2 is the triangle of Figure 1,
whose vertices are the points b£ = [0;0]0, bx = [1;0]0,
by = [0;1]0 which correspond respectively to the vacuous
belief function b£ (mb£(£) = 1), the Bayesian b.f. bx with
mbx(x) = 1, and the Bayesian b.f. by with mby(y) = 1.
The region P2 of all Bayesian b.f.s on £2 is the segment
Cl(bx;by). In the binary case consistent belief functions
can have as sets of focal elements one between ffxg;£2g
and ffyg;£2g. Therefore the space of cs.b.f.s CS2 is the
union of two one-dimensional simplices (line segments):
CS2 = CSx [ COy = Cl(b£;bx) [ Cl(b£;by):
1Here Cl denotes the convex closure operator: Cl(b1;:::;bk) = fb 2
B : b = ®1b1 + ¢¢¢ + ®kbk;
P
i ®i = 1; ®i ¸ 0 8ig.b =[0,0]' Θ
b =[0,1]' y
b =[1,0]' x
b
B
P
m (x)
m (y) b
b
CS
CS
2
2
x
y
Figure 1. The belief space B for a binary frame
isatriangleinR2 whoseverticesarethebasis
b.f.s focused on fxg;fyg and £. The probabil-
ity region is the segment Cl(bx;by), while con-
sistent b.f.s live in the union of two segments
CSx = Cl(b£;bx) and CSy = Cl(b£;by).
4 The Lp consistent approximation problem
The geometry of the binary case hints to a strict rela-
tion between consistent belief functions and Lp norms. As
the plausibility of all elements of their core is 1, plb(x) = P
A¶fxg mb(A) = 1 8x 2 Cb, the region of consistent b.f.s
CS =
©
b : max
x2£
plb(x) = 1
ª
=
©
b : k¹ plbkL1 = 1
ª
is the set of b.f.s for which the L1 norm of the plausibility
distribution is equal to 1. This is strengthened by the ob-
servation that cs.b.f.s correspond to possibility distributions
(Section 2), which are in turn inherently related to L1.
It makes then sense to conjecture that the consistent
transformation we obtain by picking as distance func-
tion in the approximation problem (2) one of the clas-
sical Lp norms kb ¡ b0kL1 =
P
Aµ£ jb(A) ¡ b0(A)j,
kb ¡ b0kL2 =
qP
Aµ£(b(A) ¡ b0(A))2, or kb ¡ b0kL1 =
maxAµ£fjb(A) ¡ b0(A)jg will be meaningful.
When looking for a probabilistic approximation p[b] =
argminp2P dist(b;p) the use of Lp norms leads indeed to
quite interesting results. The L2 approximation produces
the so-called “orthogonal projection” of b onto P [6], while,
at least in the binary case, the set of L1/L1 probabilistic
approximations of b coincide with the set of probabilities
dominating b: P[b] : = fp 2 P : p(A) ¸ b(A) 8A µ £g.
AstheconsistentcomplexCS isacollectionoflinearspaces
(better, simplices which generate a linear space) solving the
problem (2) involves ﬁnding a number of partial solutions
csx
Lp[b] = arg min
cs2CSx
kb ¡ cskLp (4)
Figure 2. To minimize the distance of a point
from a simplicial complex, we need to ﬁnd
all partial solutions (4) for all maximal sim-
plices in the complex (empty circles), and
later compare these partial solutions to se-
lect the global optimum (black circle).
(see Figure 2). Then, the distance of b from all such partial
solutions has to be assessed in order to select a global op-
timal approximation. In the rest of the paper we will apply
these scheme to the three different approximation problems
associated with L1 and L2 respectively.
5 Approximation in the binary case
To get some insight on how to proceed in the general
case we will ﬁrst consider the case study of a binary frame
(Figure 3), and discuss how to approximate a b.f. b 2 B2
with a Bayesian or a consistent belief function when using
an Lp norm.
We denote by pLp[b] : = argminp2P kb¡pkLp the probabil-
ity which minimizes the Lp distance from b. Analogously
wewillusethenotationcsLp[b] : = argmincs2CS kb¡cskLp
for consistent approximations. In the Bayesian case we get
pL2[b] =
h
mb(x) +
mb(£)
2
;mb(y) +
mb(£)
2
i0
;
this probability is called orthogonal projection ¼[b] of
b onto P [6], and coincides with the pignistic function
BetP[b] [22, 4] in the binary case.
pL1[b] instead, is the whole set of probabilities “dominat-
ing” b [15], i.e.,
pL1[b] = P[b] : =
©
p 2 P : p(A) ¸ b(A) 8A µ £
ª
: (5)
From Figure 3 illustrates the geometry of all Lp Bayesian
and consistent approximations of a belief function b in the
binary frame. We can notice that:
1. the solution of the L1 approximation problem deter-
mines an entire set CS[b] of consistent b.f.s;
2. on the other hand, L1/L2 approximations on the sameb =[0,0]' Θ
b =[0,1]' y
b =[1,0]' x
b
P
m (x)
m (y) b
b
CS
CS x
y P[b]=p  [b]
L1
p  [b]=p  [b]=BetP[b]
L2 Linf
CS[b]=cs  [b]
Linf
cs  [b]=cs  [b]
L2 L1
m (x)+
b m (y) b m (x)−
b m (y) b
Figure 3. The dual behavior of Bayesian pLi[b]
and consistent cLi[b] approximations of a b.f.
b associated with the norms L1;L2;L1 are
shown in the binary case.
component CSx of CS are point-wise and coincide;
3. the corresponding consistent transformation csx
L2[b]
maps the original belief function b to a new b.f. with fo-
cal elements A [ fxg, for each f.e. A of b, with b.p.a.
mcsx
L2[b](x) =
X
A:A[fxg=fxg
mb(A) = mb(x);
mcsx
L2[b](£) =
X
A:A[fxg=£
mb(A) = mb(y) + mb(£):
4. ﬁnally, the global L1/L2 consistent transformations also
coincide, as they belong to the same component of the con-
sistent complex.
These facts (except the last point, which turns out to be
an artifact of binary frames) are valid in the general case.
Here we are going to focus on L1/L2 approximations.
6 Consistent L1/L2 approximations
In the case of an arbitrary frame a cs.b.f. cs 2 CSx is a
solution of the L2 approximation problem if, again, b ¡ cs
is orthogonal to all generators of CSx:
hb ¡ cs;bBi = 0 8B ¶ fxg:
We denote by ®(A) : = mcs(A) the b.p.a. of cs so that we
can write cs =
P
A¶fxg ®(A)bA (according to Equation
(3)), and introduce the notation ¯(A) : = mb(A) ¡ ®(A).
As b¡cs =
P
A(£ ¯(A)bA the orthogonality condition
reads as
­P
A(£ ¯(A)bA;bB
®
= 0 8B ¶ fxg, i.e.,
½ X
A¶fxg
¯(A)hbA;bBi +
X
A6¾fxg
mb(A)hbA;bBi = 0: (6)
The L1 minimization problem reads instead as
argmin
~ ®
© X
A¶fxg
¯
¯
X
BµA
mb(B) ¡
X
BµA;B¶fxg
®(B)
¯
¯ª
=
argmin
~ ¯
© X
A¶fxg
¯ ¯
X
BµA;B¶fxg
¯(B) +
X
BµA;B6¾fxg
mb(B)
¯ ¯ª
which is clearly solved by setting all addenda to zero, ob-
taining the linear system:
½ X
BµA;B¶fxg
¯(B)+
X
BµA;B6¾fxg
mb(B) = 0 8A ¶ fxg:
(7)
Linear transformation. We are going to show here that
the two minimization problems associated with the linear
systems (6) and (7) coincide. The solution is indeed con-
served due to the fact that the second linear system is ob-
tained from the ﬁrst one through a linear transformation.
Lemma 1
P
B¶AhbB;bCi(¡1)jBnAj = 1 if C µ A, 0 oth-
erwise.
Corollary 1 The linear system (6) can be reduced to the
system (7) through a linear transformation of rows:
rowA 7!
X
B¶A
rowB(¡1)jBnAj: (8)
Proof. If we apply the linear transformation (8) to the sys-
tem (6) we get
X
B¶A
[
X
C¶fxg
¯(C)hbB;bCi +
X
C6¾fxg
mb(C)hbB;bCi](¡1)jBnAj
=
X
C¶fxg
¯(C)
X
B¶A
hbB;bCi(¡1)jBnAj+
+
X
C6¾fxg
mb(C)
X
B¶A
hbB;bCi(¡1)jBnAj 8A ¶ fxg:
Therefore by Lemma 1 we get
X
C¶fxg;CµA
¯C +
X
C6¾fxg;CµA
mb(C) = 0 8A ¶ fxg
i.e. the system of equations (7). ¤
Form of the solution. To obtain both the L2 and the L1
consistent approximations of b it then sufﬁces to solve the
system (7) associated with the L1 norm.
Theorem 1 The unique solution of the linear system (7) is
¯(A) = ¡mb(A n fxg):Proof. We can prove it by substitution. System (7) becomes
¡
X
BµA;B¶fxg
mb(B n fxg) +
X
BµA;B6¾fxg
mb(B) =
= ¡
X
CµAnfxg
mb(C) +
X
BµA;B6¾fxg
mb(B) = 0: ¤
Therefore, according to what discussed in Section 4, the
partial consistent approximations of b on the maximal com-
ponent CSx of the consistent complex have b.p.a.
mcsx
L1(A) = mcsx
L2(A) = ®(A) = mb(A) ¡ ¯(A)
= mb(A) + mb(A n fxg)
for all events A such that fxg µ A ( £.
The value of ®(£) can be obtained by normalization:
®(£) = 1 ¡
X
fxgµA(£
®(A)
= 1 ¡
X
fxgµA(£
mb(A) + mb(A n fxg)
= 1 ¡
X
fxgµA(£
mb(A) ¡
X
fxgµA(£
mb(A n fxg)
= 1 ¡
X
A6=£;fxgc
mb(A) = mb(fxgc) + mb(£)
as B 6¾ fxg iff B = A n fxg for A = B [ fxg.
Corollary 2 mcsx
L1(A) = mcsx
L2(A) = mb(A) + mb(A n
fxg) 8x 2 £, and for all A s.t. fxg µ A µ £.
Interpretation as focused consistent transformations.
The basic probability assignment of the L1/L2 consistent
approximations of b has an elegant expression. It also has
a straightforward interpretation: to get a consistent b.f. fo-
cused on a singleton x, the mass contribution of all events
B such that B [fxg = A coincide is assigned indeed to A.
But there are just two such events: A itself, and A n fxg.
As an example, the partial consistent approximation of a be-
lief function on a frame £ = fx;y;z;wg with core fxg is
illustrated in Figure 4. The b.f. with focal elements fyg,
Figure 4. A belief function (left) and its
L1=L2 consistent approximation with core fxg
(right).
fy;zg, and fx;z;wg is transformed by the map
fyg 7! fxg [ fyg = fx;yg;
fy;zg 7! fxg [ fy;zg = fx;y;zg;
fx;z;wg 7! fxg [ fx;z;wg = fx;z;wg
into the consistent b.f. with focal elements fx;yg, fx;y;zg,
and fx;z;wg and the same b.p.a.
Partial solutions to the L1=L2 consistent approximation
problem turn out to be related to classical inner consonant
approximations of a b.f. b, i.e. the set of consonant belief
functions such that c(A) ¸ b(A) 8A µ £ (or equivalently
plc(A) · plb(A) 8A).
Dubois and Prade [10] proved indeed that such an approx-
imation exists iff b is consistent. However, when b is not
consistent a “focused consistent transformation” can be ap-
plied to get a new belief function b0 such that
m0(A [ xi) = m(A) 8A µ £
and xi is the element of £ with highest plausibility.
Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 state that the L1/L2 consistent
approximation onto each component CSx of CS generates
the consistent transformation focused on x.
Global optimal solution for L1. To ﬁnd the global
consistent approximation of b we need to work out which
of the partial approximations csx
L1=2[b] has minimal dis-
tance from b. To do so we need to minimize the distance
kb ¡ csx
L1=2[b]k. In the L1 case we have
kb ¡ csx
L1[b]kL1 =
X
Aµ£
jb(A) ¡ csx
L1[b](A)j
=
X
A6¾fxg
jb(A) ¡ 0j +
X
A¶fxg
¯
¯b(A) ¡
X
BµA;B¶fxg
®(B)
¯
¯
=
X
A6¾fxg
b(A) +
X
A¶fxg
¯ ¯
X
BµA
mb(B)+
¡
X
BµA;B¶fxg
(mb(B) + mb(B n fxg))
¯
¯ =
X
A6¾fxg
b(A)+
+
X
A¶fxg
¯
¯
X
BµA;B6¾fxg
mb(B) ¡
X
BµA;B¶fxg
mb(B n fxg)
¯
¯
=
X
A6¾fxg
b(A) +
X
A¶fxg
¯ ¯
X
CµAnfxg
mb(C) ¡
X
CµAnfxg
mb(C)
¯ ¯
=
X
A6¾fxg
b(A) =
X
Aµfxgc
b(A):
(9)
Immediately,
Theorem 2 The global optimal L1 consistent approxima-
tion of any belief function b is given by
csL1[b] : = arg min
cs2CS
kb ¡ csx
L1[b]k = cs^ x
L1[b]
i.e. the partial approximation associated with the element ^ x
which minimizes (9):
^ x = argmin
x
© X
Aµfxgc
b(A);x 2 £
ª
:In the binary case (Figure 3) the condition of Theo-
rem 2 reduces to ^ x = argminx
P
Aµfxgc b(A) =
argminx mb(fxgc) = argmaxx plb(x) and the global ap-
proximation falls on the component of the consistent com-
plex associated with the element of maximal plausibility.
Unfortunately, this is not generally the case for arbitrary
frames of discernment £. Let us see this in a simple coun-
terexample. We can write
X
Aµfxgc
b(A) =
X
Aµfxgc
X
BµA
mb(B) =
X
Bµfxgc
mb(B)¢
¢jfA µ fxgc : A ¶ Bgj =
X
Bµfxgc
mb(B) ¢ 2jfxg
cj¡jBj:
(10)
Now, consider a belief function on a frame £ =
fx1;:::;xng of cardinality n, with just two focal elements:
mb(x1) = mx, mb(fx1gc) = mb(fx2;:::;xng) = 1 ¡ mx.
If mx < 1=2 all y 6= x1 have maximal plausibility, as
plb(x1) = 1 ¡ b(fx1gc) = mx, while plb(y) = 1 ¡ mx
for all y 6= x. However, according to (10),
kb ¡ cs
x1
L1[b]kL1 =
X
Aµfx1gc
b(A)
= (1 ¡ mx)2n¡1¡(n¡1) = 1 ¡ mx;
where n = j£j, while
kb ¡ cs
y
L1[b]kL1 =
X
Aµfygc
b(A)
= mx2n¡1¡1 = mx2n¡2
8y 6= x. But when
mx2n¡2 ¸ 1 ¡ mx ´ n ¸ 2 + log2
¡1 ¡ mx
mx
¢
kb ¡ cs
x1
L1[b]kL1 · kb ¡ cs
y
L1[b]kL1 8y 6= x1, therefore the
global L1 consistent approximation can fall on a compo-
nent not associated with the maximal plausibility element.
Global optimal solution for L2. In the L2 case
kb ¡ csx
L2[b]k2 =
X
Aµ£
(b(A) ¡ csx
L2[b](A))2 =
=
X
Aµ£
¡ X
BµA
mb(B) ¡
X
BµA;B¶fxg
®(B)
¢2
=
=
X
Aµ£
¡ X
BµA
mb(B) ¡
X
BµA;B¶fxg
mb(B)+
¡
X
BµA;B¶fxg
mb(B n fxg)
¢2
=
X
A6¾fxg
(b(A))2+
+
X
A¶fxg
¡ X
BµA;B6¾fxg
mb(B) ¡
X
BµA;B¶fxg
mb(B n fxg)
¢2
=
X
A6¾fxg
(b(A))2+
+
X
A¶fxg
¡ X
CµAnfxg
mb(C) ¡
X
CµAnfxg
mb(C)
¢2
so that, in analogy with the L1 case,
kb ¡ csx
L2[b]k2 =
X
Aµfxgc
(b(A))2:
Theorem 3 The global optimal L2 consistent approxima-
tion of any belief function b is given by
csL2[b] : = arg min
cs2CS
kb ¡ csx
L2[b]k = cs^ x
L2[b]
i.e. the partial approximation associated with the element
^ x = argmin
x
© X
Aµfxgc
(b(A))2;x 2 £
ª
:
Other simple counterexamples show that the global L2 con-
sistent approximation can fall on a component not associ-
ated with the maximal plausibility element.
7 Comments and conclusions
Belief functions represent coherent knowledge bases in
the theory of evidence. As consistency is not preserved by
most operators used to update or elicit evidence, the use of
a consistent transformation in conjunction with those com-
binations rules can be desirable. Consistent transforma-
tions are strictly related to the problem of approximating
a generic belief function with a consistent one.
In this paper we solved the instance of the consistent ap-
proximation problem we obtain when measuring distances
between uncertainty measures by means of the classical Lp
norms. This makes sense as cs.b.f.s live in a simplicial com-
plex deﬁned in terms of the L1 norms, and correspond to
possibility distributions. A partial approximation for each
component of the complex has to be found. The conclu-
sions of this study are the following:
1. partial L1/L2 approximations coincide on each compo-
nent of the consistent complex;
2. such partial approximation turns out to be the consistent
transformation focused on the given element of the frame;
3. the corresponding global solutions have not in general as
core the maximal plausibility element, and may lie in gen-
eral on different components of CS.
The interpretation of the polytope of all L1 solutions is
worth to be fully investigated in the near future, in the light
of the intuition provided by the binary case, in particular
its analogy with the polytope of consistent probabilities. A
natural continuation of this line of research is obviously the
solution of the Lp approximation problem for consonant be-
lief functions, as counterparts of possibility measures in the
theory of evidence.Proof of Lemma 1
We ﬁrst note that, by deﬁnition of dogmatic belief func-
tion bA (Section 3),
hbB;bCi =
X
D¶B;C;D6=£
1 =
X
E((B[C)c
1 = 2j(B[C)
cj ¡ 1:
Hence
X
BµA
hbB;bCi(¡1)jBnAj =
X
BµA
(2j(B[C)
cj ¡ 1)(¡1)jBnAj
=
X
BµA
2j(B[C)
cj(¡1)jBnAj ¡
X
BµA
(¡1)jBnAj
=
X
BµA
2j(B[C)
cj(¡1)jBnAj;
as
P
BµA(¡1)jBnAj =
PjBnAj
k=0 1jA
cj¡k(¡1)k = 0 for
Newton’s binomial:
n X
k=0
pkqn¡k = (p + q)n: (11)
Now, as both B ¶ A and C ¶ A the set B can be de-
Figure 5. Decomposition of B into A+B0+B00
in the proof of Lemma 1.
composed into the disjoint sum B = A + B0 + B00 where
; µ B0 µ C n A, ; µ B00 µ (C [ A)c (see Figure 5), so
that the above quantity can be written as
X
;µB0µCnA
X
;µB00µ(C[A)c
2j(A[C)j
c¡jB
00j(¡1)jB
0j+jB
00j =
X
;µB0µCnA
(¡1)jB
0j X
;µB00µ(C[A)c
(¡1)jB
00j2j(A[C)j
c¡jB
00j
where
X
;µB00µ(C[A)c
(¡1)jB
00j2j(A[C)j
c¡jB
00j = [2+(¡1)]j(A[C)j
c
= 1j(A[C)j
c
= 1, again for Newton’s binomial (11).
The desired quantity becomes
P
;µB0µCnA(¡1)jB
0j which
is nil for CnA 6= ;, equal to 1 when CnA = ;, i.e. C µ A.
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